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The current international tax system based upon the principles of source and residence is no 
longer suited to a globalised world economy, and the fundamentals of the international tax 
system need to be re-examined.  An R+F based cash-flow tax based on the principle of destination 
has been proposed as a suitable alternative to taxing corporations in an international setting.  The 
aim of this paper is to discuss the legal and practical issues which would arise in the 
implementation of such a tax, namely how a destination-based tax could be effectively designed 
and implemented. For this purpose we draw on experiences with designing VAT systems 
worldwide.  It is proposed that the destination principle should be implemented through use of the 
customers’ location as the main legal proxy. We argue that the country where the customer is 
located has both the substantive jurisdiction to tax, i.e. the legitimacy to impose tax, and 
enforcement jurisdiction to tax, i.e. the effective legal and implementing means of collecting the 
proposed tax.  As regards enforcement jurisdiction to tax, we propose that a one-stop-shop 
system similar to that being experimented in VAT as the most effective means of collecting tax. 
Other potential implementing issues are addressed, namely deductibility of expenses and tax 
credits, susceptibility to avoidance and fraud, treatment of financial transactions, and treatment 
of small businesses.  We conclude that, if it were applied in an international cooperation setting, it 
would indeed be legitimate and administratively possible to implement a destination-based 
corporate tax. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international allocation of rights to levy corporation tax has been traditionally based on two 
principles: source and residence.  However, in a globalised world economy, where capital flows 
freely, and new economic realities dominate, both residence and source based taxation distort 
international trade and movement of capital and business. .  In this paper, we start from first 
principles to consider radical reform of the international system. We begin with what we believe are 
two reasonable two criteria for assessing proposals for an international system of taxing corporate 
profit. We focus on a setting in which all countries aim to co-operate in implementing taxes to 
maximise total welfare. The two criteria are: 
(1) to identify a location of taxation which creates minimum distortion to the economic behaviour 
of multinational companies, to the ownership of assets and to competition between companies 
selling in the same market; and 
(2) to identify a location of taxation that has jurisdiction to tax, from both a substantive 
perspective, i.e. a sufficiently strong connection between the country and the profits to justify 
levying the tax, and an enforcement perspective, i.e. the ability to collect the tax at minimum 
costs, which minimises the opportunities for avoidance and fraud. 
The key to identifying an appropriate location to minimise economic distortions is in identifying the 
mobility of different factors. A large company generates its profit from many activities. It needs 
investors – shareholders and creditors; a head office, and/or parent company; a variety of activities, 
including R&D, production, marketing and finance; and sales to third parties. A multinational 
company may site these activities in a large number of different countries. It makes little economic 
sense to ask where it makes its profit. All of these activities are necessary but not sufficient for 
generating profit. Indeed, the multinational company probably generates higher profit because it 
operates in many different countries. 
However, not all of these activities are equally mobile. In particular, individuals tend to be less 
mobile than other activities. For example, the shareholders and customers of a multinational 
company are unlikely to shift their place of residence in response to taxation of the multinational’s 
profit. By comparison, there is plenty of empirical evidence that companies locate their activities 
(and profit for the purposes of existing taxes) in lower-taxed jurisdictions. The benefit of associating 
tax with an activity that is not mobile is that the location will not change as a result of introducing 
the tax. These considerations therefore point to taxing the profit in the place of residence either of 
the shareholders or the customers.  
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In this paper, we consider a tax based in the place of the customer –a destination-based tax.  It is 
important to note here that the point of first criterion is not to levy the tax in the place of 
consumption per se, but in a place where the relevant activity is relatively immobile. These may 
often be the same, but where they are different the distinction becomes important, as discussed 
below. 
Specifically, we consider, proposals for a “destination-based cash flow” tax on corporate profit, 
which has been proposed elsewhere.1 It has been established in a theoretical setting that, under 
certain conditions, a destination-based cash-flow tax would not distort the investment, financial, 
pricing or location decisions of multinationals.2 Such a tax would have the following broad 
properties: immediate expensing of all investment expenditure; inclusion of net financial inflows in 
the tax base; and a zero rate of tax on exports, but a tax on all imports.  The first two features 
essentially define the R+F-based cash flow tax of the Meade Committee.3 IN a domestic context, the 
properties of this tax are well known; in effect, the government becomes a shareholder in the 
company – through deductions for expenditure it contributes a share of all costs, and it collects the 
same share of all income. It therefore does not distort investment and financing decisions in a 
domestic context, and for this reason it has been consistently advocated by economists for 
corporation tax reform.4   
It is the third feature however that changes the location of taxation of profits from the international 
norm; it is also the key feature of value added taxes. Broadly, this third feature means that income 
from an export is taxed in the jurisdiction in which the customer purchases the good or service, 
rather than where the good or service is produced or provided. To the extent to which the location 
of a sale to a final consumer is fixed by the purchaser’s place of residence, then the tax on the 
income generated by a multinational company does not depend on the location of the company 
itself.  
                                                          
1
 See, for example, R. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” 
(2000) Harvard Law Review 113(7), 1573-1676, at 1670-1671; S. Bond and M.P. Devereux. “Cash flow taxes in 
an open economy” (2002) Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper 3401; 
M.P. Devereux and P. Birch Sorensen, “The Corporate Income Tax: international trends and options for 
fundamental reform” (2006) European Commission Economic Papers 264; European Economic Advisory Group, 
The EEAG Report on the European Economy (CESifo Group Munich, 2007), Chapter 5, 121-32; A. Auerbach, 
M.P. Devereux and H. Simpson, “Taxing Corporate Income” in J. Mirrlees et al (eds.), Dimensions of Tax Design: 
The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 837-893; A. Auerbach, “A Modern Corporate 
Tax”, The Hamilton Project (2010); A. Auerbach and M.P. Devereux, “Consumption and Cash-Flow Taxes in an 
International Setting” (2012) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 12/14; 
M.P. Devereux, “Issues in the Design of Taxes on Corporate Profit” (2012) National Tax Journal 65(3), 709-730. 
2
 See S. Bond and M.P. Devereux (2002) and A. Auerbach and M.P. Devereux (2010), both above. 
3
 Meade Committee, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978). 
4
 We discuss below modifications of this basic tax base to encompass financial companies, which is based on 
Meade’s “R+F” base. 
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However, the tax has an asymmetric basis; although sales would be taxed in the purchaser’s place of 
residence, expenses would receive tax relief in the place in which they were incurred. It might be 
thought that this would give an incentive to locate expenses in high tax countries. However, in 
theory at least, this should not occur. The reason is that the price of the intermediate goods or 
services used by the company would be affected by the tax. This is clearest to see if the intermediate 
goods or services were imported. In this case, the tax on the import would be exactly offset by the 
relief against tax available to the purchasing company. But the same would be true of intermediate 
goods and services supplied domestically; their price would also be driven up by the tax, so that 
there would be no distortion between domestically-sourced goods and services and imported goods 
and services. The tax would therefore not distort the location of production, or other activities of a 
company. In principle, at least, it therefore satisfies criterion 1.  
This paper therefore sets out to consider how such a  tax could be designed and implemented. The 
main focus in this paper is to consider the design and implementation issues if all countries agreed 
to coordinate on this tax as a new international norm. We make some comments on the issues 
arising is a single country, or group of countries, wished to implement the tax unilaterally; however, 
we discuss this in more detail in a follow-up paper.  
Issues involved in transforming existing corporation taxes into R+F-based cash flow taxes are well 
known and we do not discuss them in any detail here; instead we focus on issues which would arise 
in implementing the third feature, the destination basis of the tax.  The paper naturally draws 
heavily on the design of value added taxes, since they are already used in most countries, and there 
is a wealth of experience of dealing with international issues in their design.5 However, the proposals 
set out below do not blindly follow VAT rules as implemented in Europe or elsewhere. Instead we go 
back to first principles to identify what features the tax should ideally have, and then consider how 
tax rules could be designed to meet such principles as closely as possible. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Part II briefly summarises the theory of the 
optimal location of taxes on corporate profit, and relates that to existing practice; Part III sets out 
proposals for the legal design of a destination-based cash flow tax, if implemented in all countries. In 
this part of the paper we consider namely issues concerning substantive jurisdiction to tax, 
enforcement jurisdiction to tax, in particular administrative obligations and susceptibility to fraud 
and avoidance, and the scope of the tax, such as treatment of financial transactions and of small 
businesses.  
                                                          
5
 Most recently addressed by the OECD in OECD International VAT/GST Guidelines, Draft Consolidated Version, 
February 2013.  For further references see Part III below. 
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II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION OF CORPORATE TAXING RIGHTS 
Allocation of the right to tax the profit of multinational companies is done through international tax 
rules set out in national tax systems.  In theory therefore each country is free to choose the 
jurisdictional connection that best suits its needs.  However, complete sovereignty is subject to 
limitations, namely voluntary limitations imposed by the country itself, usually for economic policy 
or market-induced reasons; negotiated limitations through bilateral or multilateral conventions, 
such as Double Taxation Treaties (DTT); and externally imposed limitations, such as those imposed to 
countries listed as tax heavens.6  Whether EU law limitations should be characterised as negotiated, 
or externally imposed limitations,7 or – perhaps more importantly – whether they amount to an 
international tax regime, are controversial questions.8  Regardless of the answer to these questions, 
however, in practice the principles underpinning international tax rules are similar worldwide, and 
date back to the work carried out by the League of Nations in the 1920s. 
Concerned about avoiding double taxation and tax evasion – which it perceived to be intrinsically 
linked – the League of Nations initiated a process in the early 1920s that ultimately led to the first 
model tax convention in 1928.9  Broadly based on an initial report carried out by four economists in 
1923, the first model convention embraced the single tax principle, i.e. that all income should be 
taxed only once, and set-up the basic guidelines for allocation of taxing rights, i.e. the principles that 
should underpin the jurisdiction to tax income.10  Arguably based on the benefits principle,11 the 
work of the League of Nations established two main bases for income tax jurisdiction: residence and 
source.  In the following decades residence-based and source-based taxation consolidated as two 
foundational principles of international allocation of taxing rights – due to a great extent to the 
influence of the OECD DTT model – to the point where there is a traditional assumption that they 
enjoy universal agreement.12 
                                                          
6
 See C.E. McLure, “Globalization, Tax Rules and National Sovereignty” (2001) Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 55(8), 328-341, at 333. 
7
 See R. de la Feria, “Place where the supply/activity is effectively carried out as an allocation rule: VAT v. 
Direct taxation” in M. Lang et al (eds.), Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation – Similarities and Differences 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), 961-1014, at 963-964. 
8
 See R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), at Chapter 1, and references cited therein. 
9
 League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Report Presented by the Committee of Technical 
Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, G.216.M.85.1927.II., April 1927. 
10
 For a comprehensive historical analysis see M.J. McIntyre “Developing Countries and International 
Cooperation on Income Tax Matters: An Historical Review”, 2005, mimeo. 
11
 See R. Avi-Yonah n. (…) above, at 11 et seq; on the benefits principle see Part III, section A below. 
12
 M.J. Graetz, “The David R. Tillinghast Lecture – Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies” (2000-2001) Tax Law Review 54, 261-336, at 269. 
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A. Residence vs. Source-Based Taxation 
The terms residence and source are commonly used, but can have different meanings, especially 
when comparing economic and legal literatures. This can lead to considerable confusion in 
understanding principles of the location of taxation of corporate profit, which is worth briefly 
elaborating upon. 
Under the residence principle, countries tax residents – including corporations – on their worldwide 
income, regardless of where it is earned. However this deceivingly simple definition hides significant 
differences in concept. Theoretical economics literature tends to regard residence as the place 
where the owner of the income stream resides; it also typically assumes – often implicitly – that 
individuals invest only domestically, and thus a company is owned by domestic residents, with no 
distinction in location between the shareholders’ residence and the company’s residence. In much of 
the theoretical literature, the place of residence is therefore taken as fixed, although of course, this 
correspondence need not hold in practice, and a parent company of a multinational may be owned 
by shareholders worldwide. In this case, the residence of the parent company would not reflect the 
residence of its owners, and instead the location of the parent company is as mobile as the location 
of any other part of the company, since it is not constrained by the residence of its owners.  By 
contrast, for legal purposes residence is assessed individually as regards every independent legal 
person. Thus the parent company and all its subsidiaries – as separate legal entities – may be 
deemed to be resident in the country in which they are located, i.e. the place of incorporation 
and/or the place of management.  
Under the source principle a country may tax income having its source in that country, regardless of 
the residence of the taxpayer. The economics literature regards the source of the corporation’s 
profit as the place where the profit is earned – separately from the place where the owner of the 
profit resides. But of course, where the profit is earned is generally not well defined, and thus source 
is mainly a term that can be distinguished from residence – where the person with the rights to 
receive the profit is located. By contrast again, source has a technical meaning for legal purposes, 
identifying the location in which profit is generated when there is no legal residence – typically when 
the company has a permanent establishment, but no legal residence in that location. 
Most countries do not model their tax systems exclusively in either source or residence, but rather 
have a hybrid system. Very broadly, the OECD model convention assigns tax rights on active business 
income to the source country, and on passive income to the residence country.  But this is a source 
of dispute: it is generally believed that traditionally developed – capital exporting – countries tend to 
place heavier emphasis on the residence principle; whilst capital importing countries in general place 
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more emphasis on the source principle.13 This is reflected in the view that, while the UN model 
convention, developed in the 1980s, places a stronger emphasis on source-based taxation. These 
comments reflect the economic sense of these terms, not the legal sense.  
Traditionally the view of residence-based taxation – again in the economic sense – as superior to 
source-based taxation has been a central tenet of the normative theory of international taxation.14 
The is because if the  place of residence is fixed (because the owners are immobile), then a tax based 
on residence will not affect the location of activities; the tax system will exhibit capital export 
neutrality, CEN.15 However, there is no merit in basing the allocation of profit on the legal 
interpretation of residence, since that form of residence is not fixed; doing so will not ensure CEN. 
This comment also applies mutatis mutandis to basing the allocation of profit on the residence of 
the parent company; this residence is not fixed, and doing so will not generate CEN, since the parent 
company itself may move to a lower-taxed country.16  More recently, the economics literature has 
considered whether differences in taxes between countries can give rise to distortions to the 
ownership of companies – another aspect of the more general notion of production efficiency; the 
absence of such distortion is known as capital ownership neutrality, CON.17  The precise 
requirements for the international tax system to generate CON are still in dispute:18 although it has 
been claimed that source-based taxation in the economic sense would be required, this is only true 
in very specific circumstances. 
In practice, the international tax system is now closer to source-based taxation in the traditional 
economic sense. The US is the only major country that still attempts to tax the worldwide income of 
its resident companies; and even then it does so only on repatriation and with a partial credit for 
taxes already paid – with the result that huge funds are held offshore to avoid the US tax on 
repatriation. Within the EU, secondary tax legislation too leans towards source-based taxation in the 
traditional economic sense, since most withholding taxes on flows of dividends interest and royalties 
                                                          
13
 For an overview of the rationale for adopting either residence or source-based taxation see P. Musgrave, 
“Consumption Tax Proposals in an International Setting” (2000-2001) Tax Law Review 54, 77-100, at 77 et seq. 
14
 See M. Keen and D. Wildason, “Pareto-Efficient International Taxation” (2004) American Economic Review 
94(1), 259-275. 
15
 A term originally introduced by R. Musgrave in "Criteria for foreign tax credit" (1959) Taxation of Operation 
Abroad, The Tax Institute, Princeton. 
16
 See J. Voget, “Headquarter Relocations and International Taxation” (2011) Journal of Public Economics 95. 
17
 See M. Desai and J. Hines, “Evaluating International Tax Reform” (2003) National Tax Journal 56(3), 487-502; 
and M. Desai and J. Hines, “Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting” (2004) 
National Tax Journal 57(4), 937-960. 
18
 See M.P. Devereux, C. Fuest and B. Lockwood “The Taxation of Foreign Profits: a Unified View” (2013) Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 13/3. 
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within the EU are no longer permitted,19 although the position of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) is less clear or consistent.20 
However, this leaves to one side the significant difficulties in defining the economic notion of the 
source of profit. There are two distinct problems with basing the international tax system on this 
concept. The first is that differences in tax rates between countries distort the location of productive 
activity. It is possible to try to balance this distortion against the distortions created by the lack of 
ownership neutrality, yet global production efficiency cannot be achieved by residence or source-
based taxation unless they are fully harmonised.21  More fundamentally, however, as argued above, 
there is usually no single source of profit: profits arise from many locations as a multinational takes 
advantage of local conditions to maximise its worldwide profit. The absence of a clear concept of 
where profit is generated means that ultimately the traditional economic concept of source is of 
little value. The current international tax allocation rules have been characterised as a flawed 
miracle.22  We agree that they are flawed; we are less persuaded that they are a miracle. 
It is clear, therefore, that neither of the traditional economic notions of residence and source serve 
any longer as an adequate basis for the allocation of rights to tax the profits of multinational 
companies. Such a conclusion gives rise to the question of whether there is an alternative model. Is 
it possible to conceive of a model for allocation of corporate taxing rights, which would meet the 
two criteria outlined in the introduction: which would minimise distortions, whilst still satisfying the 
principle of jurisdiction to tax, from both a substantive, as well as an enforcement perspective? 
B. Destination-Based Taxation 
Proposals for a paradigm shift in allocation of corporate taxing rights have emerged in the early 
2000s. In 2000, Avi-Yonah proposed that the OECD should adopt a regime that taxed multinationals 
as an initial matter in the country of consumption of the goods or services provided by them.23 In 
                                                          
19
 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 OJ L225, 20/08/1990, 6; the 
Interest and Royalties Directive, Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003, OJ L157, 26/06/2003, 49;and the 
Savings Tax Directive, Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 OJ L157, 26/06/2003, 38-48. 
20
 Defending that source-based taxation would be consistent with CJEU jurisprudence, see E.C.C. Kemmeren, 
“Source of Income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based Approach” 
(2006) Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 60(11), 430-452.  For a contrary view see B.J.M. Terra 
and P.J. Wattel, European Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, Fourth Edition, 2005), at 80-83.  For 
an comprehensive analysis of why the Court is in a “labyrinth of impossibility”, see M. Graetz and A. Warren, 
“Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe” (2005-2006) Yale Law 
Journal 115, 1186-1255. 
21
 M. Devereux, “Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations” 
(2008) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24(4), 698–719. 
22
 See R. Avi-Yonah, “The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification” (1996) Texas Law 
Review 74, 1301-1359, at 1303-1304. 
23
 R. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State” (2000) Harvard Law 
Review 113(7), 1573-1676, at 1670-1671. 
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2002, Bond and Devereux proposed a cash flow tax on a destination basis.   This proposal was 
further developed in a series of papers published in the following years, where the properties of a 
destination-based corporate tax were explored further, confirming that – as opposed to residence or 
source-based corporate taxes – such a tax would not create distortions to any margins of business 
decisions, namely choice between discrete options, choice of scale of investment, choice of form of 
income, and choice of source of finance.  The destination-based tax would still be a tax on corporate 
profits, but would work similarly to a VAT: the key difference between the two being the treatment 
of labour, which would be regarded as deductible business costs under the proposed destination-
based tax, but are not so under a VAT.24 
These studies show that it is indeed possible to theoretically conceive of an alternative model for 
allocation of corporate taxing rights, which is neither based on residence or source, but rather on 
destination.25  Moreover, it is argued that this alternative model would in principle significantly 
minimise economic distortions, when compared to existing models – indeed support for such a 
paradigm shift has been gathering momentum.26  The subsequent question therefore is whether  
and how that theoretical model would work in practice, allowing us to identify a location of taxation 
which creates minimum economic distortions, and had a substantive and enforcement jurisdiction to 
tax. 
 
III. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A DESTINATION-BASED CORPORATE TAX 
As noted above, whilst our proposals for designing and implementing a destination-based 
corporation tax draw heavily on the experiences of VAT, the proposals set out below do not blindly 
follow VAT rules as implemented in Europe or elsewhere  On this regard, the first point of departure 
from normal VAT rules is particularly significant. The OECD defines the destination principle as the 
“principle whereby internationally traded services and intangibles should be subject to VAT in their 
                                                          
24
 A. Auerbach, M. Devereux and H. Simpson, “Taxing Corporate Income” in J. Mirrlees et al (eds.), Dimensions 
of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 837-893; A. Auerbach and M. 
Devereux, “Consumption and Cash-Flow Taxes in an International Setting” (2012) Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation Working Paper Series, WP 12/14; and M. Devereux, “Issues in the Design of Taxes on 
Corporate Profit” (2012) National Tax Journal 65(3), 709-730. 
25
 It is worth noting that proposals for a destination-based corporate tax do not necessarily require a new 
allocation of taxing rights paradigm, and under the proposed economic model distortions would still be 
eliminated by applying the corporate tax rate of the country of destination. From a legal perspective, however, 
it is difficult to conceive how such result could be achieved without altering allocation of taxing rights rules. 
26
 A. Fernandes de Oliveira, “A Residência, a Fonte e a Tributação” (2007) Ciência e Técnica Fiscal, 219-299; and 
W. Barker, “A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destination-Based, Cash-Flow Tax on 
Corporations” (2012) Catholic University Law Review 61(4). 
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jurisdiction of consumption”.27  This definition is clearly linked to the notion that VAT is intended to 
be a tax on consumption, and hence levied in the jurisdiction in which the consumption takes place – 
destination is a proxy for consumption. For the purposes of the destination-based tax, destination is 
intended to be a place of relative immobility – we therefore define it to be the place of residence of 
the customer.  In this sense it is not intended as a proxy for consumption.  The criteria for 
determining whether a destination-based corporate tax is an appropriate alternative to the current 
international tax rules is not therefore linked to consumption, but rather to broad aims of an 
international system of taxing corporate profit.   
In this regard, it must be noted that it is not necessary that revenue be allocated to the country in 
which the sale to the customer takes place. To meet the requirements of criterion 1, it is not 
necessary to set out who should actually receive the tax revenue. In practical terms, mere 
application of criterion 1 could point in two directions. Indeed it is possible that the revenue is not 
allocated to the country of destination. This would be much closer to the existing system, and 
therefore perhaps easier to move towards; the key difference from the existing system would be 
that the tax rate charged by country, which retains the right to tax under the current international 
system, would depend on where the goods were sold.  Since – in the absence of international 
constraints – countries are free to choose on the applicable corporate tax rate this move would have 
limited legal consequences.  This would deem discussion of the jurisdiction to tax (criterion 2) 
unnecessary, since the current international allocation of taxing rights system would remain 
unchanged.  On the other hand, having made the case politically for the place of tax to be in the 
location of the sale to the third party, it would be difficult to allow the revenue to end up in a 
different country.  In this case criterion 2 needs to be considered, since this move would imply a 
paradigm shift as regards the current international allocation of taxing rights system: from allocation 
on the basis of residence or source, to allocation on the basis of destination. 
This last situation is the main subject of this paper. At first sight, it may seem straightforward to 
implement a tax which is very similar to VAT. Indeed, the tax base proposed for a destination-based 
tax is in effect equal to the tax base for VAT except for the treatment of labour costs – which are 
deductible the proposed, but not for VAT. There are three reasons why simply assuming the tax 
could be levied like VAT is not sufficient. First, the treatment of labour costs does raise some special 
issues: for example, a company that exports all of its produce would in principle have a negative tax 
base in its country of production (though an offsetting taxable income in the country of sales); but 
that raises the issue of how to deal with such a situation. Second, it is not proposed that the 
destination-based tax is levied on the basis of the invoice-credit method used almost universally in 
                                                          
27
 OECD (2013), as above, p. 3. 
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VAT, but rather that, like existing corporation taxes, it is based on an annual assessment of the tax 
base in each jurisdiction. Third, existing VAT rules for cross-border trade are far from 
straightforward, and indeed, a priori it is not clear that VAT rules meet the requirements of criterion 
2, as discussed below. 
The subsequent question therefore is whether the proposed destination-based corporate tax 
satisfies criterion 2 for determining the place of taxation, namely jurisdiction to tax; in essence, 
whether this model is workable from a practical, as well as conceptual, perspective.  Indeed, 
whether the tax is achievable in practice is essentially dependent on whether the country of 
destination – i.e. the country to where the sale of goods or  services is being made – has the 
jurisdiction to tax the corporate profits arising from those sales.  Jurisdiction to tax is a term often 
used, but seldom theorised; a particular useful theoretical framework is that proposed by 
Hellerstein, which distinguishes between substantive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction: 
substantive jurisdiction is the power of the state to impose tax, whilst enforcement jurisdiction is the 
power of the state to collect the tax.28  Whilst not usually recognised, there is indeed a discrete 
distinction between these two aspects of tax jurisdiction: a conceptual (or substantive) aspect, which 
encompasses the legitimacy to tax, i.e. a connection between what is being taxed and the country 
imposing the tax that is sufficiently strong to legitimise that tax; and a practical (or enforcement) 
aspect, which focus on the ability to tax, i.e. whether the country has effective legal and 
implementing means of collecting the proposed tax. 
A. Substantive Tax Jurisdiction 
Does the destination-based corporate tax have substantive tax jurisdiction? That is, is it legitimate 
for the country of destination to tax the corporate profits arising from sales in its territory?  There is 
clearly a connection between what is being taxed and the country imposing the tax.  If sales are 
being made in a country, then arguably that country is the origin of the income: it is from sales that 
profits are generated, without sales there would be no income to tax.29  The recent tax scandals 
involving companies like Starbucks, or Amazon, highlight the significance of this connection: they 
have been precisely criticised by the UK media,30 and by the UK Public Accounts Committee,31 for not 
paying tax where they are making sales. But sales are not at present the basis for the corporation 
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tax.32  Therefore, whilst their actions are being labelled as tax avoidance, in reality the reference of 
the Public Accounts Committee to “companies which generate significant income in the UK but pay 
little or no tax” is a call for a paradigm shift in the international allocation of corporate taxing rights: 
corporate income tax should be paid where the income is perceived to have been generated, i.e. 
where sales are made. 
However, whether this connection is sufficiently strong to legitimise jurisdiction to tax corporate 
income is a matter which should be assessed, not solely in the context of current public views on the 
issue, but also in light of the broader theoretical aspects of tax jurisdiction.  Traditionally the 
rationale for establishing jurisdiction to tax was based on the benefits principle, according to which 
individuals and corporations should contribute to government according to the benefits they receive 
from it.33  The principle has been subject to various formulations over the years, and has been 
heavily criticised for not standing-up to close inspection, despite its superficial logic.34  Yet, even if 
one accepts the validity of the benefits principle as a basis for jurisdiction to tax, the arguments used 
to justify source-based corporate taxation under that principle can be applied mutatis mutandis to 
destination-based corporate taxation.35  The idea that the country where the income is generated 
should be compensated can also apply to legitimatise destination-based taxation if one takes the 
origin of the income to be the place where profits are made. 
More recently fairness has emerged as an issue for establishing jurisdiction to tax.36  Fairness has of 
course various dimensions, but two of which are particularly relevant for tax jurisdiction: the first is 
the notion of entitlement; the second is the notion of inter-nation equity.  The notion of entitlement 
was originally proposed by Musgrave to legitimise source-based taxation but – similarly to the 
benefits principle – the arguments presented can be equally applied to legitimise destination-based 
taxation: countries should be entitled to tax income originating within their borders, because it is the 
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“place of income-originating activity”,37 an entitlement which stems from the principle of 
territoriality under international law;38 moreover countries should be entitled to tax income 
originating within their borders, since the countries where consumers reside provide services that 
are complementary to the consumption of their residents.39 
Under the principle of inter-nation equity each country should be allocated an equitable share of the 
tax base from cross-border transactions.  Discussions over the possibility of using tax systems as a 
means of distributing income globally started with the work of the Musgraves, who introduced the 
concept in 1972.40  Several  different approaches to the conceptualisation of inter-nation equity have 
been proposed.41 However, few have elaborated on how the inter-nation equity criterion should 
apply in practice, probably because the concept is too vague to provide specific guidance on how to 
allocate taxing powers. 42  
It is likely – though not certain – that a substantial tax reform to a destination-based tax would 
produce losers as well as gainers in terms of tax revenue. (It is not certain, for several reasons; if 
there is less tax avoidance, then the total tax base will increase; further, since governments would 
not face competitive pressure under a destination-based tax, they would be able to raise their tax 
rates). It is not clear that the reform would be unfavourable to developing countries, for example. 
Indeed, Several developing countries already have destination-based taxation, namely for services.  
All DTTs signed by India since 1957, the 8th largest services importer in the world, include a source 
rule as regards services – very broadly defined – which taxes where payer of the service is located; 
essentially a destination-based tax rule, which uses the costumer location as proxy.  Brazil excludes 
significant portion of services from the scope of their DTTs,43 subjecting them instead to a national 
allocation rule, which too uses payer’s location as proxy for source; similar rules apply in other Latin-
American (LATAM) countries, such as Argentina, Mexico, and Peru.  Moreover, during recent 
negotiations for the new UN model convention, consideration is being given to the possibility of 
inclusion of a similar rule to those in India’s DTTs. 
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It should also be noted that moving towards a destination basis for a general corporation tax does 
not preclude special additional taxes, especially on natural resources. 
 
B. Tax Base 
Three elements of the proposed tax base are worthy of discussion. First, as is well-known, a cash-
flow tax is in effect a tax on economic rent – that profit over and above the minimum required rate 
of return. This differs from the conventional form of income tax. However, elements of cash-flow 
taxation have been used in many countries and on many occasions. Taxing only part of the 
conventional measure of profit, or the return to investment, does not seem to raise any problems of 
substantive tax jurisdiction.   
Second, the R+F base treats financial flows rather differently from conventional taxes. Essentially, 
new borrowing and interest received are added to the tax base, while lending and repayment of 
borrowing and interest payments are all deductible. The net effect of this is to tax economic rent 
earned by lenders (who receive a higher a rate of interest than they pay). This means that – unlike 
current practice for VAT - financial companies can be included in the tax base. Again, no specific 
issues of substantive tax jurisdiction seem to be raised by including financial flows in the tax base in 
this manner.  
A third issue is the scope of the tax. As with VAT, the procedures work best if all businesses are 
registered for the tax. However, that is problematic if the tax is intended to apply only to 
incorporated businesses. A more ambitious agenda would see this tax applying to all businesses, 
whether incorporated or not, just as VAT is. That would run into the possibility of double taxation, 
however, since the income of unincorporated businesses may also be subject to personal income 
tax. This issue requires more consideration; however a starting point is that the destination-based 
tax could be applied to all businesses (subject to a threshold – indeed the VAT threshold could be 
used), but that it would be creditable against personal income tax.   
 
C. Enforcement Tax Jurisdiction 
Does the destination-based corporate tax have enforcement tax jurisdiction? I.e. does the country of 
destination have the effective legal and implementing means of collecting tax on corporate profits 
arising from sales in their territories?  The proposed destination-based corporate tax is broadly 
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similar in outline to a normal VAT, also levied under the destination principle;44 indeed adherence 
to the destination principle is singled-out as one of the key areas in which all VATs are 
fundamentally similar.45  However, the allocation of taxing rights rules under a destination-based 
VAT – often known as place of supply or place of taxation rules – are far from unproblematic. 
1. Identifying Destination 
Identifying the country of destination is not as simple as it might appear, particularly as regards 
services.  VAT systems usually really on legal proxies to identify destination – itself a legal proxy for 
consumption – but how many proxies are necessary, or how complex the proxy chain is, will depend 
from system to system.  In general, all VAT systems use tangible and intangible proxies: tangible 
proxies being those that make reference to physical objects, and intangible proxies relate to features 
of the persons involved in the transaction.46 
TANGIBLE PROXIES INTANGIBLE PROXIES 
(1) the location of goods (4) the supplier location (location, residence, or place of 
business of the supplier) 
(2) the location of land (5) the customer location (location, residence, or place 
of business of the customer) 
(3) the place of performance (6) the consumer location (location, residence, or place 
of business of the person to whom the thing 
supplied is provided/rendered/delivered, or by 
whom it is received) 
 (7) the place of effective use or enjoyment of the supply 
 
The European VAT system is particularly complex, and determining the place of taxation of any 
specific transaction will depend on various questions: whether the supply made involved goods or 
services; the identity of the acquirer, in particular whether he is a VAT registered person or not; the 
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timing of the supply; the location of the supply; and the nature of the goods or services supplied.47  
However, all VAT systems use a mixture of tangible and intangible proxies, often in an interlinked 
manner, which gives rise to proxy chains.  Naturally the more complex the proxy chain is, and/or link 
between different proxies are, the more difficulties they will give rise to: increased compliance costs, 
increased litigation, opportunities for fraud and avoidance, and acting as deterrent for cross-border 
transactions, particularly for SMEs. 
The use of proxies is a universal feature of VAT systems, recommended by the OECD as the most 
practical and appropriate way in which to establish destination – and thus consumption.48  On this 
regard the rationale applies mutatis mutandis to a destination-based corporate tax: such a tax would 
be equally dependent on use of proxies to establish the place/country of destination.49 However, use 
of complex proxy chains or interlinked proxies should be avoided as far as possible, and allocation 
rules made as simple as feasible, in order to avoid extra difficulties. 
Establishing destination as regards cross-border trade in goods is relatively straightforward, and 
whilst many VAT systems make use of various proxies for different goods, using one single proxy will 
achieve destination in most cases with minimal complexity: the customer location, i.e. the location, 
residence, or place of business of the customer, the person to whom the seller has a contractual 
legal obligation to supply the goods.  Using this proxy alone will often not lead to taxation at the 
place/country of consumption, for example when an intermediary buys the goods, which are 
then to be consumed by someone else, which is why other proxies are often used in 
conjunction, such as the location of the goods, or the place of effective use or enjoyment.  This 
however is not a consideration for a destination-based corporate tax, since destination is not 
proxy for consumption, but the aim in itself.  It is possible that in a few cases using only the 
customer location proxy might not lead to taxation at the place/country of destination. 
However, for the sake of simplicity, and as long as this does not create administrative difficulties 
or opportunities for avoidance or fraud – see below – using a single proxy for identifying 
destination in all cross-border sales of goods in both business-to-business transactions (B2B) 
and business-to-consumer transactions (B2C) avoids many of the problems often witness as 
regards VAT systems. 
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Traditionally it was said that implementing the destination principle as regards cross-border trade in 
services was more complicated, and that the challenge for VAT design was how to identify – or 
provide mechanisms for identifying – the destination of services in the absence of physical flows.50  
For this reason, in the last few years the OECD has issued several guidelines on how to apply the 
destination principle to services, culminating in a version released in February 2013.51  Despite the 
additional difficulties, we propose that the same proxy is adopted for identifying destination in all 
cross-border supplies of services as suggested for sales of goods, i.e. the customer location proxy – 
with a few adjustments.52  In B2B transactions this proxy can be easily applied by reference to the 
business agreement, but it might be problematic where the customer has establishments in more 
than one jurisdiction, and the services are used by one or more establishments of those 
establishments, under an internal recharge arrangement.  The OECD proposes that in these 
cases taxing rights should be allocated on the basis of two-step proxies’ chain: first step would 
be the application of the customer location proxy; the second step would be consumer location 
proxy, i.e. the location of the establishment using the service.  Using the consumer location 
proxy makes sense as regards a consumption tax, but less so as regards a destination-based 
corporation tax.  Ignoring the internal recharges however would not respect the destination 
principle – it is therefore proposed that internal recharges should be deemed to be transactions 
which trigger the application of the customer location proxy.  As regards B2C transactions in 
cross-border services, they are perceived as creating particular difficulties in terms of administrative 
obligations since applying the customer location proxy would often result in multiple-registration, 
i.e. a requirement to register for VAT purposes in every jurisdiction where sales are carried out.53  If 
however these administrative obligations can be overcome – see below – then the customer 
location could work as a good proxy for establishing destination, without any need to use further 
proxies. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is proposed that in exceptional circumstances the proxy used for 
determining the place / country of taxation varies from the customer location proxy, particularly 
as regards B2C transactions, namely where that rule would not lead to an appropriate result or 
be too burdensome.  This will be particularly the case where the supply of services- or the 
supply of goods where no physical borders are present, such as in intra-EU supplies – require 
the physical presence of both the supplier and the customer in some way, and the service or 
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goods are supplied at a readily identifiable location, such as restaurant services and right to 
access events (concerts, sports games, fairs and exhibitions), or cross-border shopping.  Making 
an exception to the main proxy for these cases makes sense from both a VAT and a destination-
based corporate tax perspective, since in these cases destination is readily identifiable as the 
place where the supply of services / goods is carried out, and applying the customer location 
proxy could potentially lead to distortive results and fraud, as well as being burdensome for 
suppliers.  It is therefore proposed that the in these exceptional circumstances a tangible proxy 
is used: either the place of performance as regards services, i.e. the place where the service is 
effectively carried out; or the place of location as regards goods. 
Outside the scope of these exceptions is therefore e-commerce, which we propose will still be 
subject to the customer location proxy.  Applying the place of location proxy to cross-border 
shopping, whilst still applying the customer location proxy to distance sales – and in particular to 
e-commerce – will unavoidably result in an economic distortion, insofar as the profits arising 
from the sale of similar goods may be subject to different rates of corporate income tax.  
However, since studies on cross-border shopping within the EU seem to indicate that the overall 
number is relatively small – even in border regions – the distortion should not be significant.54 
2. Administrative Obligations 
One of the traditional principles of international tax law is the so-called revenue rule – also known as 
the Government of India principle –55 whereby, absent agreement or limited exceptions, countries 
will not assist in collecting taxes for another country.  Over the last decade, however, the world has 
witnessed the progressive demise of this principle insofar as income taxes are concerned, with 
increased cooperation between tax authorities spurred by EU legislation on mutual assistance, and 
various OECD initiatives on exchange of information.  This demise has largely resulted from a drive to 
combat tax evasion, but it could be much wider: it could result on the expansion of enforcement 
jurisdiction to tax, since taxes can be collected by one country on behalf of another country.56 
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Insofar as VAT is concerned, the demise of the revenue rule and (implicit) proposals for its abolition 
within the EU started decades earlier.  In 1987 the European Commission presented a series of 
proposals aimed at treating intra-EU supplies of goods and services in a similar manner as internal 
supplies.  Thus, instead of zero-rating supplies to another Member State, the VAT rate applicable in 
the Member State of departure would be charged, and the foreign VAT could simply be deducted by 
the trader in the Member State of destination, in the same way as the national input tax, i.e. through 
its VAT return.57  In order to minimise the impact of this measure on Member States’ revenues, the 
European Commission proposed the establishment of a clearing house system to ensure that VAT 
collected in the exporting country and deducted in the country of import could be credited to the 
latter.58  These proposals, which the Commission misleadingly referred as collectively representing a 
switch to the origin principle,59 were widely regarded as too ambitious.60  By 1989 it was clear that 
the Council would fail to reach an agreement and the Commission was forced to temporarily 
abandon the proposals.  The switch to the so-called origin principle remained a long-term objective 
of the Commission, however, until it was formally abandoned in 2012.61 By then the European 
Commission already had an alternative proposal, which it too would imply the demise of the 
revenue rule within the EU for VAT purposes: the one-stop-shop (OSS). 
In 2004 the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a new compliance scheme for 
businesses operating in more than one Member State, which it designated of OSS.  Designed to 
avoid the need for multiple registrations, the scheme would allow a trader to register in only one 
Member State, making its B2C supplies using a single VAT number; tax would be charged at the rate 
of the country of destination, and the revenue collected by the country where the trader was 
established, but sent to the country of destination.  The proposal received favourable feedback from 
traders and other stakeholders,62 but it failed to gather the political support for unanimous approval 
at the Council.  The big victory for the Commission came a few years later with the approval of the 
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so-called VAT package in 2008.  Whilst the package included many alterations to the EU VAT rules, it 
crucially included rules for what was later designated as the mini-one-stop-shop (MOSS) solely for 
electronically supplied services.  These rules are due to come into force on the January 1st, 2015, and 
the significant legislation has been approved in the interim period regarding the implementation of 
the MOSS, particularly as regards administrative arrangements.63   
The introduction of the MOSS has been criticised for placing extra compliance burdens on suppliers 
of electronic services, since the onus is placed on them to check the status of the acquirer – business 
or final consumer – as well as their location.64  This would be relatively straightforward on B2B 
transactions where the acquirer has to provide a VAT number; much less so as regards the B2C 
transactions.  The European Commission has recently proposed that the location of the customer is 
identified on the basis of the IP address of the acquirer of the services; however, it has been pointed 
out that IP addresses are easily manipulated. A more reliable form of detecting the location of the 
customer would be his/her residence, which can be identified on the basis of the credit card used for 
paying the transaction – of course this too can be manipulated, but the scope for fraud is much 
smaller.  The proposal is currently being discussed by the Council, and the European Commission has 
formally expressed its wish to ensure that the MOSS is successful, with a view to expanding its scope 
to other areas of trade.65 
In light of the already ongoing demise of the revenue rule for income tax purposes, as well the 
apparent success of the MOSS within the VAT area, it is proposed that the destination-based tax is 
also collected on the basis of a OSS approach, under which a given country (A) may collect the tax on 
behalf of another country (B). That is, a multinational may produce a good in A, and sell it to a 
consumer in B. In that case, it is possible for the tax authority in A to require the company to declare 
where it sells its output (ie. B), for the tax authority in A to collect the appropriate amount of tax at 
B’s tax rate, and then pass the revenue to country B.  The tax authorities of both countries could 
then do an aggregate reconciliation across all transactions in a given period.  Under such a system, 
the enforcement jurisdiction is de facto delegated by country B on country A, whilst the substantive 
jurisdiction is kept by country B, which ends up receiving the tax revenue. 
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One advantage of the OSS approach relates to the treatment of labour costs, which are the essential 
difference between the tax base of the destination-based corporation tax and VAT. In its pure form, 
a country producing in A and exporting all of its output to B would have a taxable loss in A and 
taxable income in B; it would then receive a rebate in A and pay tax in B. This tends not to happen 
with VAT since labour costs are not deductible and so the chance of having negative value added in 
A is low. But deducting labour costs this scenario could be common. It creates a problem to the 
extent that the government in A is not willing to pay a rebate; indeed if there is a chance of 
fraudulent activity it would be wise to be cautious in doing so.  
However, the OSS approach significantly reduces this problem. That is because the tax levied in A 
will include a charge at B’s tax rate on the export to B. The company resident in A would then face a 
tax charge in A similar to under a normal corporation tax system, with the exception that the tax 
rate applied to exports would be at B’s rate, rather than A’s rate. In most cases, then, the overall 
taxable profit in A would be positive and the need for a rebate would not arise.  
Of course, we expect A to make a payment to B to reflect the tax collected on B’s behalf. But this can 
be done at an aggregate level, netting off any tax collected in B on exports to A. Indeed, more 
generally, we envisage a clearing house in which many countries pool this revenue with only net 
adjustments having to be made. The adjustments for a country with balanced trade within a given 
period would net out to zero. 
These issues raise the question of the allocation of costs of collection. It would be reasonable for the  
collecting country to charge a fee for collection, which may be a small proportion of total revenue 
collected. These fees would also be netted out in a final settlement between countries. It might also 
be necessary to implement a de minimis rule where collection costs outweigh the revenue.  
Another issue is that of mispricing of within-firm transactions. This is clearly an issue with the normal 
form of corporation tax, since by under- or over-pricing a sale to another part of the multinational 
group in another country, taxable profit can be shifted to a country with a lower tax rate. However, 
this problem does not arise with the destination-based tax as long as trades are undertaken 
between entities that are subject to this form of tax. To see this, consider the possibility of routing 
an export from A to B via a tax haven, H, which has a zero tax rate. Assume the OSS system is in 
place, and that H is part of that system. Country A should tax the export at rate zero since it is 
destined for H. Country H should in principle tax the impact, although again at rate zero. But it will 
then tax the export to B at B’s tax rate; and it should pay the revenue collected to B in accordance 
with the destination principle. This is exactly the same outcome as if the export had not been routed 
through the tax haven. Further, if the buyer in B is the final consumer, the price at which the sale in 
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B takes place is determined on markets as normal. The price of the transaction from A to H does not 
affect the final tax liability, and so is irrelevant. This result continues to hold under other 
administrative arrangements as long as the tax is ultimately based in the location of the final 
customer. Any transactions within a multinational group will all net out for tax purposes.  
Finally, it should be noted that another of benefits of the OSS approach is that it prevents missing 
trader fraud. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
We have set out to consider issues in the design and implementation of a destination-based-based 
corporation tax. We draw on experiences of VAT to consider how such a tax could be levied.  Our 
starting point is to ask how the tax could be implemented if it were applied in all countries, and how 
it would be applied within a group under an international cooperation setting where some, but not 
all, countries cooperate. We believe that it would be relatively straightforward to implement the tax 
in this case: the destination country has substantive jurisdiction to tax, with destination being at 
least as legitimate basis to tax as source, perhaps more; enforcement jurisdiction is de facto 
delegated by country of .destination on residence country, which collects the revenue under an OSS 
mechanism. We have so far considered only implementation issues when the tax is up and running. 
We have not so far addressed issues of transition. 
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